![]() He then announced his support of the “one condition” offer. He stated he had given serious consideration to the situation at home and aboard. Image courtesy of the US Army Air Force.Īt the end of the theatrical demonstration of the deadlock, the emperor spoke. General view of the bombed main business district of Kobe, Japan. Hiranuma spoke pointedly of the deterioration of the “domestic situation,” particularly food supplies. The Soviets possessed immense ground power and tactical airpower, but their sealift was tiny, and hence their threat to reach the Home Islands was small. Notably, Army Chief of Staff Umezu characterized Soviet entry as “unfavorable,” but insisted it did not invalidate Ketsu Go, in which he still reposed confidence. Joining the Big Six was Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma (president of the Privy Council.) The divided Big Six and Hiranuma spoke. ![]() The Imperial conference convened just before midnight, August 9-10. There the split of the Big Six could be laid out and then the emperor invited to break the deadlock-an unprecedented action. It was agreed to summon an Imperial Conference, one held in the emperor’s presence. They prevailed on Hirohito that the Allies would treat the “four condition” offer as a rejection of peace. This triggered a counterattack by other participants in the leadership, including former Prime Minister Prince Fumimaro Konoe and the former Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu. Suzuki presumably chose this characterization as the lowest common denominator of unanimous agreement. Prime Minister Suzuki reported to Kido, the emperor’s key adviser, that the Big Six had agreed on the “four conditions” offer. With a three to three split, they were deadlocked. Under the Japanese governing system, however, the Big Six could only act when unanimous. These positions would be referred to as the “one condition” and the “four condition” Japanese peace terms. This last term would assure the continuance of the Imperial system and Hirohito’s seat on the throne. These additional terms included: 1) Japan would disarm her own forces 2) Japan would conduct any “so-called” war crimes trials of her own nationals and 3) there would be no occupation of Japan. Three members held out for three additional terms: Army Minister General Korechika Anami and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, General Yoshijiro Umezu, and Navy, Admiral Soemu Toyoda. Three members advocated that Japan accept the Potsdam Declaration with the proviso that the imperial institution be retained: Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki and Navy Minister Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai. Before them was the Potsdam Declaration setting forth Allied conditions for ending the war. For the first time, they worked on terms to end the war. During the meeting news arrived of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki. By then, they had learned of Soviet intervention into the war during the night. This study concludes that there was a banal evil induced by an ordinary lack of imagination on the part of President Truman and the American officials.The Big Six finally gathered for the meeting reacting to Hiroshima on the morning of August 9. Instead, Soviet entry into the Pacific War was the immediate causal factor in the timing of the Japanese surrender. Reviewing the dramatic events of August, 1945, Hallett concludes that few, if any lives were saved and that the dropping of the atomic bombs was merely coincidental with the ending of the war. If lives were saved, then how many were saved, he asks? Did bombs cause the surrender of Japan or was the Soviet involvement in the Pacific another influence among many that coincided with the end of the war? In this book, Professor Hallett challenges this all too comforting explanation. The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were certainly evil, but how evil? Evil in which way? Conventionally, their evil has been explained away by repeating that the atomic bombings ‘ended the war to save lives.’ If true, the evil was not truly evil. What was more important was the threat of a Soviet and American invasion, and the Japanese government preferred to deal with America rather than have the Soviets turn the country communist. In this provocative book Hallett argues that dropping the atomic bomb on Japan had no impact on their surrender to America.
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